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Abstract
This paper studies the importance of microfinance funding channels by analyzing how
for-profit and non-profit microfinance institutions’ performances differ in practice. Generally all
MFIs seek financial sustainability in order to avoid reliance on external funding and increase
efficiency. However, for-profit MFIs tend to rely more heavily on standard economic
assumptions established by the neoclassical economics model, shifting the priority away from
the social and economic development process among poor communities to the final product of
loan repayment enjoyed by such institutions. By contrast, non-profit MFIs attracting donors
contributions tend to focus more closely on shifts in social dynamics within communities they
sponsor leading to higher development enjoyed by such communities in the long run.
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Introduction

Microfinance is a source of financial services for people in need (Littlefield, 2003;
Mersland, 2010; Morduch, 1998). Such services can vary from bank saving accounts to
development financing. Microfinance is mostly associated with the provision of micro loans
called microcredit (Littlefield, 2003). Microfinance was developed due to the systemic lack of
banking infrastructure in poor, developing communities (Littlefield, 2003; Ngo, 2012). However,
microfinance is different from traditional banking services because it does not require its clients
to have collateral that guarantees future loan repayment (Vakulabharanam, 2007; Werner, 2010).
Microcredit loans and other monetary services are provided through microfinance institutions
(MFIs).
This research specifically focuses on funding channels that create two types of
microfinance institutions: for-profit MFIs (funded through investments) and non-profit MFIs
(funded through donations). Funding channels create structure and incentives under which MFIs
operate. The focus on microfinance funding channels is necessary because there has been a
significant increase in the number of for-profit microfinance institutions (Quayes, 2012), despite
the fact that the microfinance sector was developed to operate through non-profit institutions
(Roberts, 2013).
This research aims to analyze microfinance performance by focusing on how MFIs
operate. Special attention is given to concrete strategies MFIs use to perform, such as outreach,
joint liability and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, MFIs are studied through the lens of the
neoclassical economics model. The aim is to analyze how the neoclassical economics model
influences microfinance performance through strategies mentioned above. Finally, the
importance of funding channels and its relationship to the neoclassical economics model is
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established by analyzing a series of case studies for the purpose of distinguishing between forprofit and non-profit MFIs and their performance for empowering poor communities.
This research does not collect or analyze numerical data, nor does it perform its own case
studies on microfinance communities. Therefore, it shall be stated that relying on data that has
already been published, this research only creates a theoretical framework that can be used to
further expand on microfinance performance. It is my best intention to analyze the most recent
case studies in order to evaluate the present stage of microfinance performance. Yet, this research
uses a variety of sources to build on MFIs operations.
I argue that in order for communities sponsored by microfinance institutions to achieve
higher levels of social and economic development it is necessary for MFIs to go beyond the
neoclassical economics model and focus on shifts in social dynamics that signify how and in
what direction a community as a whole is moving to escape the poverty trap.
This research is divided into three sections. The first section analyzes the neoclassical
economics model as the base for financial sustainability among microfinance institutions. The
second section focuses on microfinance institutions’ operations, specifically analyzing outreach,
joint liability and entrepreneurship strategies. The aim of this section is to critically analyze how
MFIs perform while seeking financial sustainability. The third section compares funding
channels of MFIs and presents case studies in order to analyze how for-profit and non-profit
statuses affect overall microfinance performance. The paper concludes with a discussion of the
case studies’ results and their significance for evaluating microfinance performance.

Understanding Microfinance through the Assumptions of Neoclassical Economics
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Microfinance institutions tend to rely on standard economic assumptions, considering
their loan recipients as rational agents who seek profit maximization. Moreover, only when
clients succeed at maximizing their profits, can MFIs receive loan repayments and, respectively,
achieve financial sustainability (Morduch, 2000). Therefore, the neoclassical economics model
offers a concept based on profit maximization that guarantees financial sustainability for
microfinance institutions. But most importantly, the neoclassical economics model through
standard economic assumptions creates social and market structures that undermine the
importance and intrinsic value of the process, and rather concentrates on the end results
(Anderson, 2012; Lawson, 2013).
The neoclassical economics model creates a keystone for financial sustainability that
microfinance institutions operate on. It is also called financial self-sufficiency, which sets the
capacity to operate based on revenue and growth (Ayayi, 2010; Quayes, 2012). MFIs need
financial sustainability in order to avoid full reliance on their funding channels (investment and
donations).
While financial sustainability is not a matter of criticism in the field of microfinance, the
connection between neoclassical economics assumptions and financial sustainability deserve
attention, as do the way MFIs tend to achieve self-sufficiency (Hermes, 2011; Littlefield, 2003;
Kabeer, 2005; Mersland, 2010; Morduch, 1998). Microfinance institutions are criticized for
seeking financial sustainability through profit maximization because it shifts the focus away from
the progress and places it on the end result. This is also called the “one size fits all” model,
meaning the exact same approach to development is implemented in all communities. However,
this model undermines the importance of the development process, which is heavily affected by
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unique social dynamics and pre-existing stages of social and economic development that differ
across communities.
Moreover, while profit maximization might satisfy MFIs’ agenda, there is no guarantee
that it leads to social and economic development among communities MFIs sponsor. In addition
to that, it must be stated that ideally the goal of microfinance in alleviating poverty goes further
than simple profit maximization, focusing on wealth accumulation that helps to build up such
factors as human and social capital, and social institutions.
The next section will analyze how microfinance institutions rely on standard economic
assumptions of the neoclassical economics model in order to achieve financial sustainability.
More specifically, to what outcomes among communities their performance leads.

Microfinance Institutions’ Operations
Outreach
Microfinance performance is centered on MFIs’ capacity for outreach, meaning the
capacity of MFIs to locate potential loan recipients. Effective outreach is essential because
developing communities lack banking infrastructure (and for that matter very much
infrastructure at all), which signifies their inability to obtain services they need (Kabeer, 2005;
Littlefield, 2003). As a result, microfinance institutions reach out to the “core poor” - people who
most require microfinance assistance (Hermes, 2011). Furthermore, outreach programming is
based on the following concept: “The poor have skills that remain unutilized or underutilized but
suffer from a lack of capital and cannot access to funding for their business” (Monroy, 2013).
Therefore, to provide them with financial services, microfinance institutions create international
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and regional networks to identify communities that need microcredit loans for their development
(Kabeer, 2005).
The necessity for outreach by MFIs is clear, but the manner in which some MFIs reach
out has drawn criticism. Specifically, MFIs are criticized for not actually providing services to
the “core poor” (Hermes, 2011). The charge has some validity, and the reason for this failing lies
in the imperative to achieve financial sustainability (Hermes, 2011; Morduch, 1998).
However, before delving into this issue, it is necessary to take a step back and expand
discussion on social structure within developing communities. A person needs to acquire human
capital in order to perform a task. Human capital stands for knowledge and skills (Littlefield,
2003; Maldonado, 2008). In addition, given the fact that humans are social beings, a big portion
of all tasks in one way or another is connected to social institutions. Social institutions are a set
of norms of behavior that are acknowledged and accepted by everyone in a community (Ostrom,
1990; Taylor, 2011). The combination of both human capital and social institutions leads to
successful completion of a given task. In the case of microfinance services, people in poor,
developing communities need to obtain human capital and social institutions regarding profit
maximization. Without knowledge, skills and social norms necessary for adequate microcredit
loan investments, people are not able to make profits. Microfinance institutions rely on the
standard assumption that the “core poor” lack human capital and social institutions required for
profit maximization. Respectively, the inability to maximize profits leads microfinance
institutions to associate the poorest communities with higher loan write-off rates, which limit the
ability of MFIs to achieve financial sustainability (Morduch, 1998). As a result, MFIs tend to shy
away from lending in truly “core poor” environments.
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The criticism does not stop here, as there is literature in the microfinance field that
establishes poor microfinance performance in terms of development achieved among targeted
communities and financial sustainability. Microfinance institutions tend to perform worse in
regions and communities that already have certain level of development. Furthermore, the
inefficiency among MFIs is positively correlated with economic development in regions and
communities where such institutions operate (Vanroose, 2013). Higher developed communities
are more suitable for MFIs’ financial sustainability goals, since they are able to increase loan
repayment rates. Yet, such communities do not require as much microfinance assistance, because
they have greater access to traditional banking infrastructure. MFIs are unable to shift
development among communities with existing financial infrastructure through the provision of
microcredit loans. Respectively, operating in higher developed communities signifies
inefficiency among MFIs (Vanroose, 2013).
In Why Doesn't Microfinance Work, Milford Bateman (2010) explains how economic
development within communities correlates with MFIs’ inefficiency. Bateman (2010) points out
that people who require microfinance assistance the most are those with very little to no
economic development - the “core poor.” Respectively, given their rudimentary stage of
development, they can benefit from micro loans the most, since the progress they need to achieve
does not cost much in absolute terms. Yet, the “core poor” have little chance to obtain
microfinance assistance. By contrast, people who do receive microcredit loans potentially cannot
benefit from them as much as the “core poor,” because they already have a certain level of
development (it is also a reason why MFIs target them). Such development also means that they
require higher loans in order to achieve further progress. For this reason, Bateman (2010) argues
that microfinance institutions are more inefficient in terms of delivering progress to communities
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with developed economic infrastructure. By contrast, they can be efficient in achieving
development among the “core poor” communities (Bateman, 2010).
Outreach is an essential component of microfinance performance. Ideally, the goal of
MFIs is to target the “core poor” communities for two main reasons. First, people in such
communities require microfinance assistance the most. Second, such communities require very
little in absolute terms in order to achieve the next stage of social and economic development which is the goal of microfinance (i.e. to alleviate the initial poverty trap). Yet, due to the
financial sustainability goal, MFIs choose not to sponsor the “core poor” communities to avoid
loan risks, instead targeting safer communities that already have economic development and can
guarantee loan repayments.

Joint Liability
Joint liability, also called group lending, is one of the most successful loan provision
models implemented by microfinance institutions. The model is based on establishing joint
commitment, social capital and social institutions among microfinance communities (Ghatak,
1999; Hossain, 2008; Mayoux, 2001; Ngo, 2012).
Through joint liability, people in the same community form groups in order to receive
microcredit loans. Loans are provided to an entire group, while allocation and distribution of a
loan is left to its members, and depends on their communal needs and decisions (Kabeer, 2005).
In addition, members of a group take responsibility for each other’s shares of a loan. In cases
when a member is not in a situation to make a repayment of his share, other members take
responsibility for repaying his share. Furthermore, unless the entire loan is payed back to a

!8
supporting microfinance institution, the group cannot receive a new loan (Ghatak, 1999; Hossain,
2008; Ngo, 2012).
Group lending creates joint commitment, due to which members of a group become more
responsible and accountable to each other in terms of their loan investments. It is also called the
peer pressure mechanism, under which members monitor each other to ensure the success of an
entire group (Kumar, 2012; Monroy, 2013). Joint commitment and peer pressure are thought to
promise social capital and social institutions, while protecting the donor against nonpayment in
an environment of high transactions costs and little collateral from borrower. Social capital
stands for the ability of a group to create networks and relations with each other for mutual
benefit (Anderson, 2002; Hossain, 2008). As members of group lending acquire necessary
knowledge and realize potential positive outcomes from adequate loan investments, they create
communal infrastructure that includes development regarding social order and economic
progress in terms of new small scale businesses (Littlefield, 2003).
Group lending also helps to eliminate the problem of adverse selection that comes from
the outreach program (Kumar, 2012). In the field of microfinance, adverse selection is an
information asymmetry according to which MFIs choose to sponsor those clients who can show
their ability to make future loan repayments. This means people with no collateral (the “core
poor”) are not suitable clients for MFIs. But joint liability takes the focus from individual
responsibility away and shifts it to group responsibility. As a result, those people who otherwise
would not receive individual loans due to adverse selection are able to obtain financial services
through group lending (Kumar, 2012).
Nevertheless, microfinance institutions are criticized for implementing group lending
strategy for their own interests, and not for the creation of development through social capital
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and social institutions. Joint liability, through joint commitment creates social collateral, which
works as an assurance for loan repayment (Chakravarty, 2015). Furthermore, MFIs do prefer
joint liability over individual liability for the exact same reason - social collateral. In addition,
through joint commitment and peer pressure mechanism group lending enforces members to
maximize their profits in order to repay a loan. Microfinance institutions value this, since it
guarantees them financial sustainability (Ayayi, 2010; Monroy, 2013).
Moreover, microfinance institutions use a progressive lending (also called step lending)
in order to secure loan repayment rates (Kumar, 2012). As part of the progressive lending, MFIs
offer higher future loans after the initial loan is fully repaid. This creates incentives for clients to
achieve higher profit maximization in order to obtain next bigger loan.
Ideally joint liability creates many positive outcomes; such as the creation of social
capital and social institutions, as well as it takes adverse selection off from the loan provision
(Ghatak, 1999; Hossain, 2008; Littlefield, 2003; Mayoux, 2001; Ngo, 2012). It is evident that
microfinance institutions have their own incentives to implement group lending that do not
include any of the mentioned above. As part of financial sustainability, MFIs artificially create
conditions and incentives that pressure loan recipients to seek profit maximization. But whether
profit maximization leads to the actual development among poor communities is yet unclear.

Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship is the core component of profit maximization, and for that reason it is
highly valued by microfinance institutions (Bateman, 2010; Pisani, 2015; Quayes, 2012;
Shahriar, 2015). Furthermore, the outreach program and the joint liability strategy are both
implemented by MFIs in order to create conditions under which entrepreneurship becomes
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possible. Among microfinance communities entrepreneurship produces a variety of outcomes
that benefit not only entrepreneurs themselves, but also communities. There is a positive
correlation between entrepreneurship and economic development among poor communities
(Shahriar, 2015). Through self-employment, entrepreneurs are able to obtain human capital
necessary for profit maximization. Moreover, the entrance of new businesses in a community
creates social capital and social institutions, leading to higher standards of communal
development (Pisani, 2015).
Nevertheless, there are setbacks to self-employment that lead to market saturation, higher
debt and inability to accumulate wealth among entrepreneurs (Bateman, 2010). First, it is
necessary to expand on the economic structure within developing communities in order to
understand how factors such as market saturation and lack of wealth accumulation occur.
Market saturation stands for the growth of a particular business or category of goods and
services until it reaches its maximum consumption rate. In the case of microfinance
communities, market saturation occurs when multiple entrepreneurs open businesses that provide
the same category of goods or services. The very first business in its category is able to maintain
high consumption due to the scarcity of the good or service provided. However, the entrance of
other businesses in the same category diminishes demand for that good or service from the
original business, usually resulting in a price reduction due to competition. It leads to market
saturation, as the highest consumption rate enjoyed by each business is met (Bateman, 2010).
Once such rate is met, it is necessary to improve the product or service in order to attract new
buyers.
Product improvements can be achieved through economies of experience and economies
of scale. The economies of experience theory suggests with factors such as availability of
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resources, trade and market openness, higher productivity can be achieved (Oatley, 2008). To
achieve economies of experience, it is necessary to establish networks with other businesses in
the area that provide intermediate products, as well as trade within the market in order to gain
production expertise. The economies of scale theory suggests that with increase in production,
cost per unit of good or service decreases (Oatley, 2008). Once economies of experience and
economies of scale are achieved, a business can decrease the price of a unit without sacrificing
its profits in order to attract more buyers. In addition, a business is able to improve its products in
order to maintain an increasing consumption rate. In the case of self-employment within
microfinance communities, entrepreneurs are not able to achieve neither economies of
experience, nor economies of scale for the following reasons. First, due to the lack of
infrastructure and economic development, there are not enough resources that can be obtained.
Second, there are not enough businesses within poor communities that can supply intermediate
goods at a relatively low price. Third, developing communities do not have extensive market
trade with the outside world in order to gain production expertise. As a result, entrepreneurs in
poor communities are very limited in regards to how much they can increase their production,
decrease price per unit of good or service and improve their products.
Together, market saturation and the inability to achieve economies of experience and
economies of scale lead to market competition between entrepreneurs within developing
communities. The result of this competition does not produce winners, but instead forces every
business to leave the market in order to avoid future losses. Respectively, many entrepreneurs
within developing communities end up with debts due to the inability to expand their businesses
(Bateman, 2010).
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Self-employment leads to potential individual and communal benefits among poor
communities in the beginning of microfinance operations there (Bateman, 2010). In the long run,
if a community as a whole does not achieve higher level of social and economic development,
increase in the number of entrepreneurs rather leads to negative outcomes (Shahriar, 2015).
Microfinance institutions are criticized for encouraging self-employment and profit
maximization among communities they sponsor, as they try to achieve financial sustainability.
MFIs rely too heavily on standard economic assumptions and the “one fits all” model, which
undermine the process of wealth accumulation necessary for poor people to escape the poverty
trap.

Microfinance Institutions’ Funding Channels
When first introduced, the microfinance concept was intended to operate as a non-profit
institution. However, recently there has been a significant growth in the number of for-profit
microfinance institutions (Chakravarty, 2015; Quayes, 2012; Roberts, 2013; Shahriar, 2015). For
this reason, it is important to study the difference between the two types of funding channels in
order to further expand on microfinance performance and the potential relationship between two.
According to Roberts, “In 2009, 490 of the 1,169 MFIs (or 42%) covered in the MIX
Market database were for-profit MFIs and they collectively controlled roughly two-thirds of the
more than $65 billion worth of assets deployed in that year.” (Roberts, 2013). There is concern
regarding the increasing number of for-profit MFIs because it is unclear whether such institutions
can successfully operate in the sector that was intended to be non-profit. Specifically, the
following criticism of “whether it is possible to effectively blend non-profit ideals and for-profit
orientations, and practices” is being raised (Chakravarty, 2015; Roberts, 2013).
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To study the relationship between funding channels and microfinance performance this
research forms a hypothesis, consisting of two parts that can be tested through further analysis of
case studies:
1. For-profit microfinance institutions heavily rely on standard economic assumptions of the
neoclassical economics model, seeking financial sustainability, resulting in lower levels
of social and economic development in the long run among the communities they
sponsor.
2. Non-profit microfinance institutions go beyond standard economic assumptions of the
neoclassical economics model focusing on social dynamics achieve higher level of social
and economic development in the long run among communities they sponsor.
For-profit, also called profit-oriented microfinance institutions are funded through investments
(Chakravarty, 2015; Shahriar, 2015). The majority of investments originates from corporations
and can be either of external or internal sources. This type of funding creates a structure for
microfinance institutions that is centered on investments and profits. As a result, for-profit MFIs
are motivated to expand on potential gains from their investment in order to make profits. Profitoriented microfinance institutions also experience greater influence from outside of the sector,
meaning their investors, which plays an important role for the overall performance among such
MFIs. Therefore, for-profit MFIs’ efficiency is measured in their ability to make profits and be
financially sustainable (Chakravarty, 2015; Shahriar, 2015).
On the opposite end, non-profit microfinance institutions are funded through donations
(Chakravarty, 2015; Quayes, 2012; Roberts, 2013; Shahriar, 2015). Such MFIs are not centered
on profit maximization. Respectively, their performance is measured not in profits from
investments, but rather in monitoring the social dynamics development among the communities
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they sponsor. From a donor view, non-profit MFIs’ efficiency depends on the ability to empower
poor, developing communities and present evidence of such empowerment. Furthermore, inflow
of funding (donations) depends on donors’ satisfaction in MFIs’ success at achieving their stated
objectives.
Before going any further it is important to clarify that all microfinance institutions seek
financial sustainability, given the nature of the sector. Therefore, funding channels and MFIs’
status as for-profit or non-profit does not lead to institutions being more financially sustainable or
less. Respectively, the argument and the hypothesis this research raises is that for-profit MFIs do
focus primarily on profit maximization factor in order to achieve financial sustainability. While
non-profit MFIs while still seeking to be financially sustainable, go beyond profit maximization
and focus on social dynamics development among communities they sponsor.
Sugato Chakravarty and Mariya I. Pylypiv (2015) in their study, “The Role of
Subsidization and Organizational Status on Microfinance Borrower Repayment Rate,” use
available data from two major sources on microfinance activities (Microfinance Information
Exchange and the World Bank) to analyze how external funding channels affect MFIs
performance. More specifically, this research focuses on how for-profit and non-profit
microfinance institutions differ in regards to their repayment rates among loan recipients.
Chakravarty and Pylypiv (2015) aim to learn how funding channels (investments and donations)
affect the relationship between loan recipients and microfinance institutions that support them.
This research uses multilevel analysis to discover the following: “The results show that an
increase in the number of borrowers leads to an increase in loan write-offs associated with forprofit MFIs and an increase in their total risk” (Chakravarty, 2015). This essentially means that
for-profit MFIs that are funded through investments have higher outreach performance.
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However, with an increase in the number of loan recipients, for-profit MFIs also experience
higher loan risk associated with frequent write-offs. In contrast, “MFIs with higher donation-tosubsidy ratios have lower negative relationships with their respective portfolios-at-risk-at-30days and lower total risk,” which means non-profit microfinance institutions funded through
donations, while not having significant loan provision growth, nevertheless, have better
performance in terms of loan repayments. Furthermore, Chakravarty and Pylypiv (2015) state
that non-profit MFIs also have better institution-borrower relationships.

For-Profit Microfinance Institutions
Peter W. Roberts (2013) in his work, “The Profit Orientation of Microfinance Institutions
and Effective Interest Rates,” addresses the issue of how the increase in for-profit MFIs affects
microfinance performance and efficiency. Roberts (2013) uses MIX data to perform analysis on
how the growth and development of for-profit MFIs results in the fluctuation of microcredit loans
interest rates, the outreach program performed by such MFIs and their overall efficiency.
Multiple results were discovered through this analysis. First, as it was expected, the outreach
program of for-profit MFIs has increased compared to the overall microfinance performance.
However, with that Roberts (2013) points out that for-profit MFIs avoid targeting rural clients.
Respectively, such results indicate that the overall number of loan recipients has risen, yet, the
overall outreach performance in terms of targeting the “core poor” has not. Another important
result signifies the increase in loan interest rates. Even though Roberts (2013) does not provide
concrete evidence on how it affects the institution-borrower relationship, it can be argued that it
does not lead to positive outcomes. Furthermore, Roberts (2013) points out a very important
condition which is necessary for MFIs to outreach and increase their efficiency. It is being
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competition between microfinance institutions, due to which interest rates can go down and in
practice benefit loan recipients. This in fact should be the main goal for microfinance in general.
However, for-profit MFIs do not allow such competition to happen, keeping interest rates high.
With that, the paper concludes on rather surprising finding: “…distracting managers from
addressing the specific needs of their poor clients, the stronger profit orientation leads MFIs
away from the efficiency frontier”. As Roberts (2013) points out, such factor is an example of Xinefficiency - a theory developed by Harvey Leibenstein. The X-inefficiency theory suggests that
a firm’s expected behavior regarding development does not match its actual status. There is no
concrete evidence to why this occurs. Nevertheless, Roberts (2013) argues that even in theory
for-profit MFIs are not associated with higher profitability when compared to non-profit MFIs.
This respectively raises a question: “Why at all to create and support for-profit MFIs if they are
keeping high interest rates for loan recipients and do not maximize profits?” (Roberts, 2013).
Abu Zafar M Shahriar, Susan Schwarz and Alexander Newman (2015) in their work
“Profit Orientation of Microfinance Institutions and Provision of Financial Capital to Business
Start-Ups” also focus on the analysis of the rising number of for-profit MFIs and their particular
role in sponsoring small scale start-up businesses. More specifically, this paper analyzes how
funding channels (investments and donations) motivate to either sponsor start-up businesses or
rather avoid loan risk. Shahriar et al. (2015) uses multivariate analysis to compare how for-profit
MFIs view different types of businesses, varying from small scale to bigger and more developed
projects. In addition, the analysis also showcases how such MFIs view their profits regarding the
provision of loans to different types of businesses. Shahriar et al. (2015) mention that results
signify the following: “…the rate of lending to start-ups is much higher among not-for-profit
MFIs compared to for-profit MFIs”. To further elaborate on this, results do not claim that for-
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profit MFIs do not want or do not help small scale business start-ups, but they are more
interested in profits they can make from lending loans to more mature business developments,
than non-profit MFIs. Finally, Shahriar et al. (2015) claim that in performed analysis there are no
other variables that could suggest for-profit MFIs behavior rather than reaching for profits and
avoiding loan risks.

Non-Profit Microfinance Institutions
Nompumelelo Thabethe, Vhumani Magezi and Mandla Nyuswa (2011) performed a case
study “Micro-credit as a community development strategy: A South African case study”, which is
based on The Men’s Project in Africa (also known as TMP). TMP is a community based nonprofit microcredit institution which was established in 2003. It operates based on donations and
grants. TMP focuses on internal social dynamics and gender norms in communities it targets.
The reason it is called “The Men’s Project” is due to social gender norms in South Africa,
according to which men have more power than women. While the majority of MFIs choose to
empower women, TMP takes a very different approach on addressing social problem of gender
inequality. TMP believes that in order to shift the gender hierarchy in KwaZulu-Natal region it is
essential to educate men who hold the power in the first place. Another important factor which
makes TMP such successful example is the fact that it focuses on monitoring how loan recipients
make decisions regarding allocation and distribution of incoming financial services. For many
micro loans recipients, including those in Kwa-Zulu-Natal region financial services are new,
which means recipients do not have necessary social and economic skills for the proper
allocation of loans. Therefore, the outcome of microfinance performance depends on the
outreach and provision of loans, but also on whether recipients are able to learn and create social
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institutions that are essential for adequate investment. This complex framework resulted in the
creation of group lending. A group consisting strictly of men was provided with a loan. The
group was consistently monitored by TMP specialists to record how social dynamics are shifting.
Results showcase progress achieved by the group as a whole in acquiring knowledge regarding
loan investment. Furthermore, it resulted in the creation of local businesses which tend to benefit
not only their owners, but the entire community.
Michael J. Pisani (2015) performed a case study “Microfinance in Rural Haiti: A Case
Study of Institutional Start-Up & Microenterprise Development”, which is based on a non-profit
MFI run by only two people. This case study is based on HAPI-Kredi which is a non-profit MFI
created as a result of Haiti earthquake in 2010. The entire budget of this institution was funded
through church-centered charitable donations. HAPI-Kredi focuses on a specific region in Haiti Mizak. This MFI uses the joint liability strategy and primarily targets women empowerment.
Usually a group of three women receive loans in the following values: $75 or $100 or $125.
After overseeing for two years how this start-up is performing the following results were made.
Compared to big for-profit MFIs, HAPI-Kredi is still struggling with the planning and structural
foundation, which significantly limits outreach and overall efficiency performance. However, it
already shows sign of improvement given the institution-borrower relationship which suggests
that due to lower loan interest rates people of Mizak are able to obtain higher loans, repay them
on time and continue cooperating with this institution.

Conclusion
This research approached microfinance institutions’ operations through the neoclassical
economics model, which is built on profit and utility maximization. It was argued that the
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neoclassical economics model creates a keystone for financial sustainability based on which
MFIs operate in order to avoid reliance on external funding and maximize efficiency. However,
profit maximization (which leads to financial sustainability) is the “one size fits all” model,
implementation of which in poor communities cannot be efficient due to unique social dynamics
structure and pre-existing stages of economic development among microfinance communities.
The analysis of MFIs operations showed that while profit maximization creates
conditions within poor communities for higher loan repayment rates, it does not always lead to
social and economic development among sponsored communities in the long run. Therefore, the
aim of this research was to expand on whether all MFIs are structured in the same way, under the
neoclassical economics model. As the point of entry, MFIs were broken down into two categories
based on their funding channels: for-profit MFIs (sponsored through investments) and non-profit
MFIs (sponsored through donations). It was established that funding channels dictate the
structure and incentives based on which institutions operate. This research formed a hypothesis,
consisting of two parts: 1. For-profit microfinance institutions heavily rely on standard economic
assumptions of the neoclassical economics model seeking financial sustainability achieve lower
level of social and economic development in the long run among communities they sponsor. 2.
Non-profit microfinance institutions going beyond standard economic assumptions of the
neoclassical economics model focusing on social dynamics achieve higher level of social and
economic development in the long run among communities they sponsor.
While the majority of literature on microfinance so far has been limited to only
distinguishing between types of funding channels (Chakravarty, 2015). This research has gone
further to analyze how in practice the status of MFIs (for-profit and non-profit) correlates with
social and economic development among poor communities.
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Results indicate that for-profit MFIs have higher outreach program in terms of the
number of loans provided, when compared to non-profit institutions. However, non-profit MFIs
specify more in targeting the “core poor” - people who require microfinance assistance the most.
For-profit MFIs experience inefficiency (X-inefficiency) in their loan provision. This factor could
be correlated with the following: for-profit MFIs have higher loan interest rates, which takes their
loan repayment rates down. On the opposite, non-profit microfinance institutions performance
leads to higher efficiency due to lower loan interest rates, which respectively, brings loan
repayment rate up. Finally, non-profit MFIs are able to create better networks and establish better
institution-borrower relations with their clients, when compared to for-profit MFIs.
Results stated above signify that the hypothesis created by this research is true. While forprofit microfinance institutions seek financial sustainability by focusing primarily on profit
maximization undermine the importance of progress among communities they sponsor. On the
opposite, non-profit MFIs go beyond standard economic assumptions built on profit
maximization, and rather focus on monitoring shifts in social dynamics are able to deliver
economic development to poor communities in the long run.
Lastly, this research shows that funding channels are important for microfinance
performance for a reason that they dictate the structure and create incentives that motivate MFIs
to pursue different agendas.
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